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1  Introduction
The decision in Aron Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd1 still confirms the 
most fundamental aspect of company law more than a century after the 
decision was handed down, namely the principle of limited liability in a 
company. In terms of this principle the contractual creditors of the company 
can only look to the company for the payment of the company’s debts and not 
to the shareholders of the company. Liability is therefore on the contractual 
party of the creditor. This principle has also now been codified in the new 
Companies Act 71 of 2008.2 The traditional approach to hold a shareholder 
liable for the obligations of the company of which he or she is a shareholder is 
the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine, or to argue that the company is the 
agent of the shareholder, or that the subsidiary and the holding company were 
in fact a partnership.3
This article will, however, explore the possibility of holding the holding 
company liable for the losses suffered by a contractual creditor of the 
subsidiary of the holding company. The article does not intend to investigate 
whether the holding company is liable for the debt of the subsidiary to the 
creditor but whether the relevant creditor has an independent delictual action 
against the holding company for the loss it suffered due to the actions of the 
holding company. In this regard the article only deals with a delictual action 
based on pure economic loss which the creditor suffered in the context of 
a letter of comfort which was issued by the holding company to a creditor 
of its subsidiary. The article therefore does not deal with the piercing of the 
corporate veil doctrine. The context of the article is that a creditor lent money 
to a subsidiary company. The holding company, instead of issuing a guarantee 
for that debt, issues a letter of comfort to the creditor of its subsidiary. The letter 
of comfort either states that it is the (current) policy of the holding company 
to ensure that its subsidiary meets its obligations or that it is the (current 
and future) policy of the holding company to ensure that its subsidiary meets 
* I would like to thank Prof Max Loubser for his valuable comments
1 [1897] AC 22 (HL)
2 S 19(2) of the Companies Act
3 D Milo “The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Subsidiary: Is Salomon still Alive and 
Well?” (1998) 115 SALJ 318 323-333
       
its obligations. The creditor extends further credit to the subsidiary and the 
subsidiary cannot repay the loan. The creditor looks to the holding company 
for repayment. The creditor attempts to hold the holding company liable in 
contract, based upon the letter of comfort, but fails.
Due to the failure of the contractual action, the creditor considers an action 
based on delict against the holding company. The article will focus on the 
nature of an action for pure economic loss in South African law and which 
factors a court will take into consideration to impose liability on this basis. 
The focus will be on the element of wrongfulness and when there could be a 
legal duty on a person to not cause pure economic loss to another. Thereafter 
the article will focus on the legal nature of a letter of comfort. Finally it will 
be argued that a letter of comfort could under certain circumstances impose a 
legal duty on a holding company to not cause pure economic loss to a creditor 
of its subsidiary. The questions of negligence and legal causation will only be 
looked at in a cursory manner.
2  Possible delictual liability
A creditor would have to prove the elements for delictual liability to succeed 
with any claim against the holding company.4 The advantage of this option is 
that it does not require the piercing of the corporate veil, since the purpose 
is not to make the holding company liable for the debts of the subsidiary 
company. Olaerts, with reference to Bartman and Dorresteijn,5 states in this 
regard that a delict by the holding company is required for indirect piercing (of 
the corporate veil) and therefore this does not violate the principle of limited 
liability. The shareholder is not held liable for the debts of the (subsidiary) 
company but for its own debts, which are the result of its delict committed 
against the creditors of the subsidiary company.6
Wrongfulness in the context of an action for pure economic loss requires 
either proof that a subjective right has been infringed or that a legal duty has 
been broken.7 It would appear that the problem with proving of wrongfulness 
in the context of pure economic loss is the question whether there was a legal 
duty on the wrongdoer vis-à-vis the wronged. In Arthur E Abrahams and 
Gross v Cohen8 the court held:
“Setting the boundaries of liability ex delicto for causing what has come to be styled as pure economic 
loss not flowing from physical damage has been a major concern of Western Courts in recent times. 
Fear of introducing what Cardozo J in Ultramares Corporation v Touche [(1931) 255 NY 170 179 
4 See MM Loubser, R Midgley, A Mukheibir, L Nessing & D Perumal The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 
ed (2012) 21 for the requirements for delictual liability, namely wrongfulness, fault, causation, conduct 
and harm
5 SM Bartman & AFM Dorrestijn Van het concern (2006) 231
6 M Olaerts Vennootschappelijke beleidsbepaling in geval van financiële moeilijkheden; de positie van 
bestuurders en aandeelhouders PhD thesis Maastricht (2007) 194 in the original states:
“Doordat voor indirecte doorbraak een eigen onrechtmatige daad van de moedervennootschap vereist 
is, wordt met deze rechtsfiguur… strict genonem geen inbreuk gemaakt op het pricipe van de beperkte 
aansprakelijkheid  De aandeelhouder wordt immers niet persoonlijk aansprakelijk gesteld voor de 
schulden van de vennoorschap maar voor zijn eigen schulden, schulden die resulteren uit een door hem 
jegens de crediteuren van de dochtervennootschap gepleegde onrechtmatige daad ”
7 PQR Boberg The Law of Delict (1984) 104
8 1991 2 SA 301 (C)
94 STELL LR 2013 1
       
(74 ALR 1139 1145)] called ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’ has deterred Courts from upholding too readily claims for damages for pure 
economic loss unassociated with physical damage. Thus, the mere fact that the loss which has 
occurred was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant is not necessarily per se sufficient to have 
given rise to a legal duty to act or to abstain from acting in order to avoid the loss.
As I see the position it comes to this. A defendant may be held liable ex delicto for causing pure 
economic loss. [I]t will have to be established that the possibility of loss of that kind was reasonably 
foreseeable by him and that in all the circumstances of the case he was under a legal duty to prevent 
such loss occurring. It is not possible or desirable to attempt to define exhaustively the factors which 
would give rise to such a duty because new situations not previously encountered are bound to arise 
and societal attitudes are not immutable.”9
The most difficult point therefore that a plaintiff in a group context has to 
prove is that the holding company had a legal duty not to cause him loss. The 
other aspects of delictual liability may not necessarily be much easier though. 
The focus of this article will, however, be on the issue of whether a legal 
duty could be imposed on a holding company under specific circumstances to 
not cause pure economic loss to certain specific creditors of its subsidiaries. 
Of the most recent South African cases in respect of pure economic loss, 
the most relevant for purposes of this article are the following: Telematrix 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority of 
SA,10 Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank Ltd11 (“Holtzhausen”), Fourway Haulage SA 
(Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd12 (“Fourway Haulage”) and Viv’s 
Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Staff Services (Edms) Bpk h/a Pha Phama 
Security.13
In Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards 
Authority of SA14 the court stated:
“When dealing with the negligent causation of pure economic loss it is well to remember that the 
act or omission is not prima facie wrongful (‘unlawful’ is the synonym and is less of a euphemism) 
and that more is needed. Policy considerations must dictate that the plaintiff should be entitled to be 
recompensed by the defendant for the loss suffered (and not the converse as Goldstone J once implied 
unless it is a case of prima facie wrongfulness, such as where the loss was due to damage caused to the 
person or property of the plaintiff). In other words, conduct is wrongful if public policy considerations 
demand that in the circumstances the plaintiff has to be compensated for the loss caused by the 
negligent act or omission of the defendant. It is then that it can be said that the legal convictions of 
society regard the conduct as wrongful…”15
The court further stated that to determine whether the law should recognise 
the existence of a legal duty requires a balancing against one another of 
identifiable norms.16 Furthermore, the courts are also wary to impose liability 
for pure economic loss if it would lead to a flood of indeterminate plaintiffs 
instituting action against the alleged wrongdoer. 17
9 1991 2 SA 301 (C) 307G-309F (original emphasis)
10 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA)  
11 2008 5 SA 630 (SCA)  
12 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA)
13 2010 4 SA 455 (SCA)
14 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA)  
15 Para 13
16 Para 16
17 Para 19
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In the Holtzhausen case H entered into an agreement to sell diamonds to 
a buyer through an agent of the buyer. He undertook to pay commission to 
the agent should the transaction be concluded. The agent informed H that the 
purchase price for the diamonds was paid into his bank account with ABSA 
and provided H with three telephone numbers to verify the deposit of the 
purchase price into his bank account. The bank account of H reflected the 
deposit of the purchase price. H contacted the bank manager of the branch 
where he held his account to ascertain whether he could proceed with the 
transaction, namely to deliver the diamonds and pay the commission to the 
agent. He told the bank manager why he needed the verification. H gave the 
three telephone numbers, which the agent gave to him, to the bank manager. 
The bank manager assured him that he could proceed with the transaction 
and also personally authorised the withdrawal of the commission payable by 
H to the agent. Fraud was subsequently discovered on the side of the agent 
and buyer and the bank account of H was debited with the amount paid to the 
agent. H now sought to recover his losses from ABSA based on the negligent 
misstatement of the bank manager. The court of first instance gave absolution 
of the instance. H appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. His action was 
based on a delictual claim for the pure economic loss which he had suffered 
due to the alleged negligent misstatement by the defendant bank.
The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Frost18 where the Appellate Division, as it then was, held that it would in 
principle be possible that a negligent misstatement which induced a person 
to enter into a contract may give rise to a delictual claim for damages by that 
person.19
The Supreme Court of Appeal also needed to clear up any confusion created 
by the decision in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd20 (“Lillicrap”) which had been misinterpreted in a number of 
decisions. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal it was decided in the 
Lillicrap case that no delictual claim would be possible where the negligence 
which was relied upon consisted of a breach of a contractual term.21 This did 
not mean, however, that a person could not choose between two actions, one 
based on delict and one based on contract, should the facts allow either one 
of the two.22 Since the plaintiff in the Holtzhausen case was not relying on a 
breach of a contractual obligation by the defendant bank but on a claim which 
he had independently of any contract with the bank, the Lillicrap decision was 
not applicable.23
On the question of wrongfulness the Supreme Court of Appeal held the 
following:
“So far as unlawfulness is concerned, the following findings might be made on the evidence led 
thus far: That the statement by the bank manager was made in response to a serious request; that the 
18 1991 4 SA 559 (A)
19 632D-F
20 1985 1 SA 475 (A)
21 633A-B
22 633H-J
23 634B-C
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plaintiff approached the bank manager because of his expertise and knowledge of banking matters; 
and that the plaintiff’s purpose in making the enquiry was, to the knowledge of the bank manager, 
to ascertain whether he could safely proceed with the transaction. It could be inferred that the bank 
manager realised that the plaintiff would rely on his answer. On the evidence led thus far, it might 
further be found that there are no considerations of public policy, fairness or equity to deny the 
plaintiff a claim; that no question of limitless liability could arise; and that an unfair burden would 
not be placed on the manager or the bank if liability were to be imposed - inasmuch as the manager 
could have refused to act on the plaintiff’s request and could have protected himself and the bank 
against the consequences of any negligence on his part by a disclaimer… Of course it goes without 
saying that at the end of the case, the trial court might come to the conclusion that no legal duty rested 
upon the bank manager to take reasonable steps to ensure that any representation which he may have 
made, was correct.”24
In Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd25 the 
court stated the following:
“Recognition that we are dealing with a claim for pure economic loss brings in its wake a different 
approach to the element of wrongfulness. This results from the principles which have been formulated 
by this court so many times in the recent past that I believe they can by now be regarded as trite. These 
principles proceed from the premise that negligent conduct which manifests itself in the form of a 
positive act causing physical damage to the property or person of another is prima facie wrongful. 
By contrast, negligent causation of pure economic loss is not regarded as prima facie wrongful. Its 
wrongfulness depends on the existence of a legal duty. The imposition of this legal duty is a matter for 
judicial determination involving criteria of public or legal policy consistent with constitutional norms. 
In the result, conduct causing pure economic loss will only be regarded as wrongful and therefore 
actionable if public or legal policy considerations require that such conduct, if negligent, should 
attract legal liability for the resulting damages.”26
The court held that a plaintiff should not only prove that the negligent 
conduct was wrongful but also that considerations of public policy give rise to 
a legal duty on a defendant. The court further stated:
“Does this mean we are back to the proposition that, in the field of pure economic loss, liability depends 
on the idiosyncratic views of the individual judge as to what is reasonable and fair? In the first instance 
some degree of certainty is established by the identification of categories where liability will be imposed. 
In Telematrix (para 15) one such category was recognised, by way of example, with reference to the 
liability of collecting banks. Another example is to be found in Perre v Apand (paras 28 - 30) where 
liability for the failure to provide accurate information or advice - ie for negligent misstatements - 
was recognised as a category of liability for pure economic loss in the context of Australian law… 
When determining whether the law should recognise the existence of a legal duty in any particular 
circumstances what is called for is not an intuitive reaction to a collection of arbitrary factors but rather a 
balancing against one another of identifiable norms. (See also eg Telematrix paras 15 - 16.) In a case like 
the present where the claim for pure economic loss falls outside the ambit of any recognised category of 
liability, the first step is therefore to identify the considerations of policy that are of relevance… The first 
policy consideration is the law’s concern to avoid the imposition of liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. (See also eg Canadian National Railway Co v Norsk 
Pacific Steamship Co (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289 ([1992] 1 SCR 1021) at 359; MM Corbett ‘The Role of 
Policy in the Evolution of our Common Law’ 1987 SALJ 52 at 59.)
But the absence of indeterminate liability itself will not automatically give rise to the imposition 
of liability. That much was expressly held in Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust para 20. The 
reason why this court refused to come to the aid of the plaintiff in that case, despite the absence of 
indeterminate liability, was that the plaintiff was in a position to avoid the risk of the loss claimed by 
contractual means (see para 24).”27
24 635E-I
25 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA)
26 Para 12
27 Paras 13, 16-25
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In Viv’s Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Staff Services (Edms) Bpk 
h/a Pha Phama Security28 the court confirmed the principles laid down by 
previous Supreme Court of Appeal decisions in respect of the establishment 
of a legal duty to answer the question of wrongfulness as follows:
“Where loss sustained is purely economic the question must be asked whether public policy, or 
the convictions of the community, require that there should be such a duty. That an action does lie 
for pure economic loss, provided that public policy requires that it should, is now settled law. It is 
not necessary to enumerate the authorities. However, courts have been circumspect in allowing a 
remedy because of the possibility of unlimited liability: the economic consequences of an act may 
far exceed its physical effect. There is a spectre of limitless liability. It is established thus that a 
court, in deciding to impose liability on an actor, must consider whether it is legally and socially 
desirable to do so, having regard to all relevant policy considerations, including whether the loss 
is finite and whether the number of potential plaintiffs is limited. Where the success of an action 
could invite a multitude of claims, sometimes for incalculable losses, an action will generally be 
denied. But in each case the imposition of liability must turn on whether, in the circumstances, 
liability should be imposed. That will in turn depend on public or legal policy, consistent with 
constitutional norms… To ensure that the question of legal or public policy is not determined 
arbitrarily, or unpredictably, a court is not required to react intuitively, but to have regard to the 
norms of society that are identifiable.”29
Loubser et al list a number of circumstances which the courts take into 
consideration to establish whether a legal duty existed on a person not to cause 
pure economic loss on a person. In the context of this article only the relevant 
circumstances will be quoted:
“Knowledge: The fact that the defendant knew or subjectively foresaw that his conduct would 
cause damage to the plaintiff is an important and often decisive factor. Such knowledge… could 
arise… from the fact that one party of necessity relies on the conduct, statement or information of 
the other.
Ability to protect oneself against liability: Could the person who suffered loss have taken 
preventative measures against the loss.
A special relationship: Was there a relationship of dependence or trust between the parties?”30
And further
“Policy considerations: a plaintiff must not only show that that the loss was negligently and 
wrongfully caused but also that considerations of public policy gave rise to a legal duty on the side 
of the defendant. In this regard a number of policy considerations are considered. The relevant ones 
for the purposes of this article are first of all courts are not willing to impose liability if it would lead 
to liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. Secondly 
courts will more easily impose liability for a single loss that affects one party who can be identified, 
that occurs once and that is unlikely to cause a large number of actions. Thirdly the extent of possible 
liability and the economic or social consequences of imposing liability: If liability could lead to 
indeterminate liability or to a multiplicity of actions the courts will be reluctant to impose a legal duty 
on a defendant.”31
The issue highlighted by the abovementioned quotations from recent cases 
and a text book concerns the legal duty which rests on the alleged wrongdoer 
towards the person who has suffered pure economic loss. It would appear that 
South African courts are still very wary of implying a legal duty on a person 
to prevent economic loss to another unless it is very clear that such a duty 
28 2010 4 SA 455 (SCA)
29 Para 6
30 Loubser et al Delict in South Africa 230
31 232
98 STELL LR 2013 1
       
existed and it is submitted that this requirement may be the most difficult 
requirement for a plaintiff to prove. The legal duty will only be imposed in 
very specific categories of circumstances although the court has stated that 
there is not a closed list of categories.
In the next section the legal nature of letters of comfort will be discussed 
in the context of a holding company issuing such letter to a lender of money 
of its subsidiary. The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether 
the principles or test laid down by our courts in respect of the imposition 
of a legal duty to not cause pure economic loss could be applied where a 
holding company issued a letter of comfort to a creditor of its subsidiary and 
the subsidiary cannot repay the loan to the creditor and thus causes harm to 
the creditor.
3  Letters of comfort
The effect of a letter of comfort by a holding company which induces a 
party to enter into an agreement with the subsidiary could be relevant in the 
context of the law of delict. Prima facie one would assume that a letter of 
comfort creates an impression of creditworthiness of the subsidiary and that 
the holding company gives comfort to a potential creditor of a subsidiary 
that the subsidiary will be able to perform. Typically a letter of comfort is 
issued by a holding company in which it confirms that it is “its policy that 
its subsidiaries are at all times able to meet their liabilities… but is usually 
designed to provide no more than moral re-assurance”.32 According to Goode 
a letter of comfort will typically be issued where the holding company refuses 
to provide a guarantee or stand surety for the liabilities of the subsidiary 
company.33
In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad34 
(“Kleinwort Benson”) Malaysia Mining incorporated a wholly owned 
subsidiary, MMC Metals Ltd with a start-up capital of £1.5 million, which 
was insufficient to trade on the London Metal Exchange. MMC Metals sought 
to obtain funds from Kleinwort Benson, a merchant bank. Kleinwort Benson 
needed some form of assurance from Malaysia Mining, the holding company 
of MMC Metals, that MMC Metals would repay the loan amount. Malaysia 
Mining issued a letter of comfort as part of an acceptance of a credit/multi-
currency cash loan facility which Kleinwort Benson granted to MMC Metals 
to a maximum of £5 million. The letter of comfort included the statement 
that it was the policy of Malaysia Mining to ensure that the business of MMC 
Metals was at all times in a position to meet its obligations to Kleinwort 
Benson in terms of the cash loan facility. The cash loan facility was later 
increased to a maximum of £10 million in reliance upon a second letter of 
comfort from Malaysia Mining which was couched in substantially identical 
terms to the first letter of comfort. MMC Metals defaulted on its obligations, 
32 R Goode Commercial Law (2004) 802
33 820
34 [1989] 1 WLR 379 (CA)
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was liquidated and “Malaysia Mining” refused to perform the outstanding 
obligations of MMC Metals towards Kleinwort Benson. Kleinwort Benson 
subsequently sought to obtain judgment for damages against Malaysia Mining 
and based its claim on the statement in the letter of comfort referred to above. 
The court a quo35 granted judgment in favour of Kleinwort Benson.
The thrust of the appeal of Malaysia Mining was that it did not enter into 
any contractual obligations to Kleinwort Benson. The court of first instance 
considered a number of authorities36 and accepted the following principles:
“(i) An agreement, even though it is supported by consideration, is not binding as a contract if it was 
made without any intention of creating legal relations.
(ii) In the case of an ordinary commercial transaction it is normally not necessary to prove that 
the parties in fact intended to create legal relations: the onus of proving that there was no such 
intention ‘is on the party who asserts that no legal effect was intended, and the onus is a heavy 
one:’ per Megaw J in Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 W.L.R 349, 355.
(iii) To decide whether legal effect was intended, the courts normally apply an objective test; for 
example, where the sale of a house is not ‘subject to contract,’ either party is likely to be bound 
even though he subjectively believed that he would not be bound until the usual exchange of 
contracts had taken place.
(iv) The court will, in deciding that question, attach weight (a) to the importance of the agreement of 
the parties, and (b) to the fact that one of them has acted in reliance upon it.
(v) In the search for agreed terms of a commercial transaction, businessmen may adopt language 
of deliberate equivocation in the hope that all will go well. It may, therefore, be artificial to try 
to ascertain the common intention of the parties as to the legal effect of such a claim if in fact 
their common intention was that the claim should have such effect as a judge or arbitrator should 
decide: see Staughton J in Chemco Leasing S.p.A v Rediffusion Plc, on 19 July 1985, cited by 
Hirst J [1988] 1 W.L.R 799, 806G. Nevertheless, the court’s task is to ascertain what common 
intentions should be ascribed to the parties from the terms of the documents and the surrounding 
circumstances.”37
The court of first instance followed the principles as set out above and came 
to the conclusion that Malaysia Mining could not prove that the parties did not 
intend that the relevant paragraph in the letter of comfort would have effect 
as a contractual term. The judge in the court of first instance held that it was 
clear that there was an undertaking on the side of Malaysia Mining that it was 
its policy to ensure that MMC Metals was in a position to meet its liabilities 
towards Kleinwort Benson in terms of the cash loan facility.
The Court of Appeal held that Malaysia Mining made a statement as to 
what their policy was, and did not in the relevant paragraph of the two letters 
of comfort expressly promise that the policy in respect of ensuring that its 
subsidiary would comply with its obligations would be continued in future. 
The Court of Appeal held that the words in question were a statement in 
respect of the present fact and not a promise of future conduct. Furthermore 
the Court of Appeal held that the concept of a letter of comfort was known to 
the parties in their negotiations, especially after Malaysia Mining refused to 
assume joint and several liability and also refused to give a guarantee for the 
35 [1988] 1 WLR 799
36 Rose and Frank Co v JR Crompton and Brothers Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261; Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 
All ER 494; Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381; Chemco Leasing SpA v Rediffusion Plc (QBD) (19-
07-1985) affirmed [1987] 1 FTLR 201 (CA); J Chitty & AG Guest Chitty on Contracts 25 ed (1983) para 
123
37 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad [1989] 1 WLR 379 (CA) 383-384  
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obligations of MMC Metals. The intention was therefore clearly that Malaysia 
Mining would give moral comfort for the obligations of its subsidiary and not 
undertake any legal liability for those obligations towards Kleinwort Benson. 
Since the preceding paragraph to the relevant paragraph expressly mentioned 
that Malaysia Mining would not reduce its financial interest in MMC Metals 
without the consent of Kleinwort Benson, the Court of Appeal held that 
this constituted a legally binding undertaking by the holding company. The 
holding company admitted in any event that the preceding paragraph to the 
paragraph in question was meant to be a legally binding undertaking. The 
Court of Appeal held that the paragraphs preceding the offending paragraph 
would have been superfluous if the intention of the parties was to create a 
legally binding undertaking in the offending paragraph.
The factual circumstances under which the letters of comfort were given 
were also very relevant. The holding company refused to be bound jointly 
and severally as co-principal debtor and refused to issue a guarantee that 
the subsidiary would comply with its obligations. The intention was merely 
to confirm that the policy of the holding company was to ensure that the 
obligations would be met but nothing prevented it to change that policy if 
circumstances changed in the future.
In Bouygues SA v Shanghai Links Executive Community Ltd38 the Hong 
Kong court confirmed the principles as set out by the Court of Appeal in 
the Kleinwort Benson case. It held that the test was whether the written 
statements by a party amounted to simple statements of fact or whether they 
were contractual promises as to future conduct. The court further held that:
“The letter of comfort was a tool of commerce developed to provide an alternative to a guarantee 
or surety. The writer was normally a parent company unwilling to give security for its subsidiary’s 
liabilities. Thus, letters of comfort were issued when the parent company did not want to incur legal 
liability, it wished to protect its own credit rating or it wanted to avoid showing a contingent liability 
on its balance sheet.”39
The court held further that:
“The question was whether the letters contained simply statements of fact regarding the parent 
company’s current policy or whether they amounted to contractual promises as to the parent 
company’s future conduct. If the former, the letter is a letter of comfort with no legal effect. If the 
latter, the promise it contains is enforceable (provided that the other elements of enforceability are 
satisfied, such as consideration). If the letter contains express words of promise, no difficulty arises… 
since the issue is ultimately one of construction, the absence of express words of promise means that 
it is necessary to consider carefully the context in which the letters were written.”40
So-called letters of awareness can in principle be described as regards their 
legal effect in similar terms to a letter of comfort. This boils down to a notice 
from the issuer that it is aware of the fact that a lender of money has made an 
offer to make a loan facility available to a prospective borrower.41 In Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd v Jurong Engineering Ltd42 the 
38 [1998] 2 HKLRD 479
39 490I-J
40 491B-E
41 Goode Commercial Law 802
42 [2000] 2 SLR 54
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Singapore High Court had to decide on the legally binding status of a letter 
of awareness. The plaintiff instituted an action for damages in the amount of 
approximately $9 million against the defendants. Huge Corporation Pte (Ltd) 
was an associate company of the first defendant for a period of time, then 
became a subsidiary company of the first defendant for a period of two years 
and then became an associate company again. When Huge was wound up it 
owed money to the plaintiff in terms of the credit facilities which the plaintiff 
had granted to it.
The facts in casu were fairly similar to the letters of comfort cases discussed 
above. The plaintiff wanted to lend money to Huge. The first defendant 
refused to give a guarantee as security for any loans to Huge but instead was 
willing to give a letter of awareness. The plaintiff drafted the letter. In one of 
the paragraphs of the draft letter the word “undertake” was replaced with the 
word “ensure” by the first defendant, to which the plaintiff did not object. Two 
further letters of awareness were issued by the first defendant in substantially 
similar terms as the first one. In the next two, however, the word “undertake” 
was not replaced by the word “ensure”. Huge started encountering financial 
difficulties and was eventually wound up. The plaintiff based their claim 
against the first defendant on the breach of the third letter of awareness.
The court in casu dismissed the plaintiff’s claim since no legal obligations 
were undertaken by the first defendant.43 The court held that a court must look 
at the substance of the agreement and not just at the terminology used by the 
parties.44 The court must furthermore look at the surrounding circumstances 
and the text of the letter of awareness to determine the intentions of the 
respective parties to the agreement.45
If these letters of comfort or awareness do not constitute legally enforceable 
obligations between the lender and the holding company, could they in any 
manner be used in a delictual action for pure economic loss which the lender 
has suffered? The elements of a delict will have to be proved for the claim to 
be successful. It is submitted that the three difficult elements will be fault, 
causation and wrongfulness. The question of causation will be addressed 
briefly later. Fault was arguably present on the side of the holding company 
through negligently creating the impression that it would stand in for the 
obligations of the subsidiary company to the lender of the funds in terms of 
a loan agreement. The negligence could also lie in the holding company not 
informing the recipient that its policy vis-à-vis the subsidiary has changed. 
Had it done so the recipient could have mitigated its losses by calling up 
its loan to the subsidiary earlier or refusing to extend further credit to the 
subsidiary company.
Since there is no legally binding contract between the parties to the letters 
of comfort in respect of the payment of the loan by the holding company, 
a legal duty could more easily be implied especially where the holding 
company is intimately involved in the management and policies of the 
43 77
44 71
45 71
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subsidiary company. The holding company is privy to the financial position 
of the subsidiary and should be aware at a very early stage that the subsidiary 
company is in financial difficulties. An ongoing duty to disclose the financial 
position of the subsidiary company could be placed on the holding company, 
not only due to the fact that it has financial information in respect of the 
subsidiary which is not readily available, but also because some form of close, 
but non-contractual, relationship exists between the lender and the holding 
company. This is not just a tenuous link which exists between the parties 
but a strong one which probably had been nurtured over time by means of 
protracted negotiations. The usual reluctance of the courts to imply a legal 
duty due to the possible proliferation of actions against the holding company 
would also not be of relevance here since the relationship is strictly between 
the lender and the holding company and not a faceless indeterminable number 
of faceless potential claimants.
When one considers the South African cases which dealt with pure 
economic loss and then specifically the cases referred to above and academic 
material, it would appear to be apt in the context of letters of comfort and 
letters of awareness. Since there is no contract between the holding company 
and the bank or recipient of the letter of awareness or letter of comfort, the 
problematic aspect of a delictual claim based on contract which the South 
African courts have been battling with, should not then enter the discussion. 
If the status of a letter of comfort and letter of awareness imposes merely 
moral obligations it still cannot be denied that some form of unique (fiduciary) 
relationship comes into existence between the holding company and the 
recipient or holder of the letter of comfort or awareness. It is questionable 
whether this relationship is purely moral in its nature. It is submitted that the 
relationship between the holding company and the recipient or holder of the 
letter of awareness or comfort is at best a quasi contractual one or at least a 
sui generis one. It is further submitted that, irrespective of the name of the 
relationship between the respective parties, due to this relationship which has 
come into existence between the holding company and the recipient of the 
relevant letter of comfort or awareness, a legal duty has arisen towards the 
recipient of that letter.
What would the content of this duty be, or put differently, what would 
constitute wrongful behaviour which would lead to the duty of care being 
breached? Should the wrongful act be the failure of the holding company to 
pay the debts of the subsidiary which then causes the holder of the letter of 
comfort loss - or should it be restricted to a situation where there was a duty 
on the holding company to inform the recipient of the letter of comfort of 
the precarious position of the subsidiary to enable that party to mitigate its 
losses by, for example, halting the provision of credit to the subsidiary? It 
is submitted that, at the very least, there rests a positive duty on the holding 
company, under these circumstances, to inform the holder of the letter of 
comfort or awareness of the financial position of the subsidiary or that its 
policy has changed, ie that it is not the policy of the holding company anymore 
to ensure that the subsidiary meets its obligations. From the moment that the 
holding company realises that there is a risk that the subsidiary company may 
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not be capable of performing its obligations and until this danger is realised 
the holding company moves from being negligent to being possibly reckless.
In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman46 the court held that if the directors are 
of the opinion that there is a risk that a company may not repay its debts 
and it incurs new debts, they could be found to have acted negligently. The 
position would be no different here where the holding company is aware that 
the subsidiary company is in financial trouble and that there is a (real) risk that 
it will not be capable of repaying any existing debt, let alone new debt. The 
silence of the holding company, namely not informing the holder of the letter 
of the impending financial difficulties of the subsidiary or that its policy has 
changed could be considered to be negligent.
The courts47 have held that the moral obligation that the holding company 
undertakes is in respect of its current policy in respect of the solvency of the 
subsidiary and that it ensures that the subsidiary will perform its obligations. 
But what is this “current policy”? Is it the policy for one financial year, or for 
two, or just until the subsidiary becomes a business liability? If the policy is 
only for one year, should there then not be a duty on the holding company 
to inform the holder of the letter of comfort or awareness that the policy of 
the company vis-à-vis its subsidiary has changed? Surely the holder of the 
letter of comfort will be under the (mistaken) belief that until it is notified to 
the contrary, the policy of the holding company is still as set out in the letter 
of comfort. Any debts therefore incurred after a change of policy or after 
the moment the holding company realises the risk of non-payment of debts, 
should be considered to be incurred through its negligence.
It should then be asked whether it would be against public policy to impose 
or imply a duty of care on the holding company towards the holder of the letter 
of comfort or awareness. There can be no convincing public policy argument 
against delictual liability. First of all there is not an indeterminate class of 
potential plaintiffs who may attempt to hold the holding company liable. The 
only plaintiff it had a legal duty to was the holder of the letter of comfort or 
awareness. Furthermore, the duty of care is based or founded on the existing 
relationship between the parties where the holder of the letter of comfort relies 
strongly on the good faith of the holding company in the absence of security 
for the debts of the subsidiary. The holding company is or should reasonably 
be aware of this reliance. The duty of care does therefore not arise casually 
but because of the prior or existing relationship between the holding company 
and the holder of the letter of comfort or awareness. The content of the duty is 
also not onerous on the holding company. It merely has to inform the holder 
of the letter of comfort or awareness that its policy towards the subsidiary 
has changed or that the subsidiary company is finding itself in financial 
difficulties. The holder of the letter of comfort or awareness can then take 
steps to either prevent or at least mitigate its losses.
Where the holding company is actively involved in the management and 
policies of the subsidiary company without necessarily having the same 
46 1998 2 SA 138 (A)
47 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad [1989] 1 WLR 379 (CA)  
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directors of its own board on the board of the subsidiary company this could 
strengthen the imposition of a legal duty which could arise based upon a letter 
of comfort which has been issued. In these cases the holding company is aware 
or at the very least should be aware of the damages which a creditor bank 
will incur should the subsidiary company incur any further debts where the 
financial position of the subsidiary is precarious. A reasonable person would 
under these circumstances foresee that a creditor may suffer loss and would 
refrain from incurring further liabilities under these circumstances. Under 
these circumstances there should be no policy considerations which should 
impede a successful action by a creditor bank against a holding company 
which has issued a letter of comfort or awareness and has not warned the 
bank that it has changed its policy towards the subsidiary company or that the 
subsidiary company is hovering precariously on the precipice of bankruptcy.
Another argument of public policy imposing delictual liability on the 
holding company could be the principles of separate juristic personality and 
limited liability in company law. Could it be argued that these two company 
law principles constitute policy arguments against the imposition of a legal 
duty on the holding company in the envisaged circumstances? It is submitted 
that these principles could not cause an impediment to the imposition of a 
legal duty. Here is no attempt to pierce the corporate veil between the holding 
company and the subsidiary company. Instead there is reliance by the plaintiff 
on the negligent and wrongful conduct of the holding company. It cannot be 
argued that a remedy is sought to circumvent the potentially more onerous 
requirements for the piercing of the corporate veil.48 The delictual requirements 
are not necessarily less strict and in any event a comparison could and should 
not be made between two unrelated causes of actions although the outcomes 
of both may be the same.
In respect of legal causation the court in the Fourway Haulage case stated 
that the question is whether the negligent conduct of the wrongdoer is linked 
closely enough to the loss suffered for legal liability to arise or whether 
the loss is too remote. Public policy according to the court determines the 
question of remoteness. One can also have regard to International Shipping 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley49 (“Bentley”) and Standard Chartered Bank of Canada 
v Nedperm Bank Ltd50 (“Standard Chartered”) in which cases there were 
negligent misstatements made which led to factual causation between the 
negligent misstatement and the loss suffered. In the Bentley matter, however, 
the court found the loss to be too remote from the misstatement whereas the 
loss in the Standard Chartered matter was not too remote. As in those two 
matters one could argue within the context of a letter of comfort that had the 
holding company informed the holder of the letter that its policy vis-à-vis its 
subsidiary had changed that the creditor would have taken steps to avert any 
losses. The question, however, is whether the loss is too remote. Naturally 
48 See Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 790 (A) and Hülse-Reutter v 
Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA)
49 1990 1 SA 680 (A)
50 1994 4 SA 747 (A)
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this will be a question of fact. In principle it could be argued that it is not 
necessarily too remote. In the Fourways Haulage case the court confirmed 
that the test for remoteness is a flexible one. With flexibility is meant that 
factors such as the absence of a novus actus interveniens, proximate cause, 
direct cause, forseeability and sufficient causation are considered but not one 
of them is necessarily conclusive.51
4  Conclusion
This article attempted to show that there could be alternative means for 
creditors of a subsidiary company which has gone insolvent to hold the holding 
company liable for its losses other than having to try to pierce the corporate 
veil. The law of delict could provide a remedy in the form of an action for 
pure economic loss. The article focused on the element of wrongfulness and 
whether a creditor would be able to satisfy this element. It was shown that 
for wrongfulness to exist that there had to be a legal duty on the holding 
company not to cause the creditor loss. The article used the letter of comfort 
as a means to illustrate that in certain specific cases there could be a legal 
duty on the holding company due to its knowledge of the reliance which the 
creditor puts on the letter as well as the special relationship which came into 
existence between the holding company and the creditor once the letter was 
issued by the holding company. The elements of negligence and especially 
legal causation may, however, be difficult to prove. A discussion of the success 
or not of proving those elements is beyond the scope of this article.
SUMMARY
A holding company often issues a letter of comfort to a creditor of its subsidiary company. The 
subsidiary company often then defaults on its obligations to that creditor. The courts generally have 
held that a letter of comfort does not create binding contractual obligations between the holding 
company and the creditor. This article investigates whether the creditor could hold the holding 
company liable in delict for the losses that the creditor suffered due to the default of the contractual 
obligations by the subsidiary company to that creditor. The article specifically considers the element 
of wrongfulness and whether there could be a legal duty on the holding company not to cause pure 
economic loss to the creditor of its subsidiary in circumstances where the holding company issued a 
letter of comfort to the creditor. This article investigates the requirements of a legal duty in cases of 
pure economic loss as well as the nature of a letter of comfort. The article concludes that a legal duty 
could be placed on a holding company not to cause pure economic loss to the creditor of its subsidiary 
depending on the wording of the letter of comfort and without sacrificing the principle of separate 
juristic personality that exist between the holding company and subsidiary company.
51 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 701A-F and Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) 
Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 165A  
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